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This article examines the effect of Trade Liberalization Agreements on the service and 
good trade. The role of institutional governance measures - rule of law and political stability on 
both trades is evaluated by considering the levels of institutional quality and the difference between 
institutional efficiencies of country pairs. The empirical gravity analysis among 43 countries 
including OECD and some non-OECD nations with the transitional economy during 2004 and 
2015 years show that participating in the same trade agreements enables countries to boost their 
trade in goods more than in service. TLA effect is driven by developed countries that have a high 
level of rule of law for both service and good trade. Moreover, institutional distance indicators 
obtain a larger impact on goods trade flow than service trade. The analysis also reveals that the 
Rule of law plays a more significant role in trade compared to political stability. 

























First of all, we want to express our gratitude to our supervisor, Priit Vahter, for the excellent 
supervision and help in preparing, investigating, conducting, and forming our paper, drawing on 
their considerable knowledge and experience, and shaping our dissertation in the light of scientific 
foundations with their guidance and detail. We thank to our reviewer Mathias Juust, who was very 
positive with his feedback and recommendations. We want to express our heartfelt gratitude to the 
entire academic staff of the University of Tartu for providing us with a high level of education and 
memorable moments that we will remember for the rest of our lives. Furthermore, we would like 
to express our gratitude to our program manager, Jaan Masso, for his full devotion and guidance 
during our master's studies. Finally, we want to take this opportunity to express huge gratitude to 



























Table of contents 
 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 8 
2.Data ............................................................................................................................................. 16 
3.Methodology: The gravity model of trade  ................................................................................. 21 
3.1. Brief Description ................................................................................................................. 21 
    3.2. Model Specification ............................................................................................................ 22 
4. Results of empirical analysis ..................................................................................................... 26 
4.1. The effect of TLA on service and good trade in a comparative way within other control 
measures ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
    4.2. The effect of the selected governance indicators on service and good trade ..................... 33 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 38 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix B .................................................................................................................................... 47 
Appendix C .................................................................................................................................... 48 
Appendix D ................................................................................................................................... 49 
Appendix E .................................................................................................................................... 50 
Appendix F .................................................................................................................................... 51 








Trade Liberalization agreements (TLAs) played a significant position in the increase of 
bilateral trade levels. Since 1986, more than 350 new trade agreements have been reported to 
the WTO of varying goals, breadth, and depth. Trade Liberalization agreements, in other words, 
free trade agreements (FTAs) do more than simply lowering and removing tariffs; they 
contribute to overcoming behind-the-border obstacles that may hinder the movement of goods 
and services; promote investment; strengthen laws governing topics such as intellectual 
property, and government procurement. To demonstrate the importance of taking into account 
the heterogeneity across trade agreements, empirical specifications of the structural gravity 
model have been used in the extensive literature, which has become a recognised tool for ex-
post trade analysis (e.g. Baier et al., 2014, 2019; Zylkin, 2016) and it has been found that FTAs 
have a more significant effect where different types of trade agreements are considered. By 
applying the gravity model of trade, most similar ex-post studies such as (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2007; Caporale et al., 2009; Baier et al., 2014; Kohl, 2014; Head and Mayer, 2014)  depicted 
the noticeable positive effect of FTAs on trade.   
This study aims to examine how TLAs affect trade volume in the service and good trade. 
We are investigating how the effect of TLAs on goods and services trade varies by the 
institutional differences between countries that trade with each other and by the institutional 
development at the importing country. 
The trade literature has primarily concentrated on the effect of entering a trade deal on 
the volume of good traded between countries and, as a response, on the well-being of these 
countries (Baier et al., 2014). Nevertheless, less focus has been devoted to analysing the effect 
of signing agreements between countries on the service trade flow. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
were the ones to present an empirical analysis showing which the probability of a pair of 
countries getting a free trade agreement in goods (FTA) is related to geographical and 
economic characteristics. Mainly in the literature, effects of FTAs in agricultural sectors have 
been depicted (Sun & Reed, 2010; Vollrath et al., 2009; Jean & Bureau, 2016). Although 
international trade in services plays an even more critical role in the global economy, the 
influence of FTAs has received relatively little attention. The first analyses to use the OECD 
data collection on bilateral trade in services to determine the indicators of bilateral trade in 
services were Deardorff (2001); Grünfeld (2003); Kimura and Lee, (2006); Francois and 
Hoekman, (2010); Mirza & Nicoletti, (2011). In the end, there were mixed results. At the same 
time, Grünfeld (2003) and Mirza and Nicoletti (2011) has observed a significant difference 
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between good and service trade, where trade in good is facilitated by FTA much more than 
service. Deardoff (2001) and Kimura and Lee (2006) have observed that the effect of trade 
agreements on exports of service is more significant than for the exports of goods, which 
suggests that the gravity equation deals well for services trade than it does with a good trade A 
limited number of empirical analyses related to this comparison made us contribute to the 
literature by analyzing the effect of trade agreements on the service trade versus trade in good 
with more recent data. Moreover, the uniqueness of our research focus lies in examining the 
interaction effect of  TLAs and institutional differences between countries on a general service 
trade compared to good trades.  
A noticeable influence of institutional quality on development directions in the world 
has been generally acknowledged by extensive studies, and it has been claimed that better 
institutional environments foster bilateral trade (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Álvarez et al., 2018; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, 2006). It is an undeniable fact that countries with higher levels of 
economic growth have considerably higher levels of the rule of law, low levels of bribery; 
persuasive bureaucracy, and strong private property protections, on the other hand, weak 
institutions lead to a negative effect on economic growth resulted in a decrease in international 
trade. Indeed, according to Álvarez et al. (2018); Levchenko (2007); Nunn and Trefler (2014); 
Freeman (2002); De Groot et al. (2004) analysis smaller gap in institutional quality of partner 
countries drive trade flow, while the huge difference in institutions leads to restraining trade.  
Compared to those studies, in addition to finding the institutional distance between the 
importing and exporting nations, we looked at the interaction effect of TLAs, institutional 
distance, and the level of institutional quality of importers where higher than 0 refers to 
developed countries, lower than 0 specifies countries with transitional economies, to evaluate 
the effect of institutional efficiency. 
The empirical part of this study applies the gravity equation of trade firstly with OLS 
estimation without fixed effect, then OLS importer-time, exporter-time effect, after that the 
Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) method to tackle issue arose by 
heteroscedasticity and MRT (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin, 2019). 
Firstly, we have compared the effects of Trade Liberalization Agreements, which include all 
kinds of free trade agreements on good and service trade.  Trade agreements themselves can 
have different effects due to heterogeneity, and from one aspect of heterogeneity, we addressed 
the institutional quality: the rule of law and political stability. In the article, not only the 
influence of TLAs between countries with different level of institutional efficiency on bilateral 
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trade analysed but also the effects of institutional differences between country pairs and the 
effect of their interaction with the TLA variable evaluated. The data originate from the 
databases of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), CEPII 
(Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales), Mario Larch's Regional 
Trade Agreements Database and World Bank.  
The main results show that being part of the same trade liberalization agreements 
enhanced good trade rather than service trade. The TLA effect is driven by developed countries 
with a high level of the rule of law for both service and good trade. Moreover, in countries with 
high institutional distance –the difference in the rule of law and political stability showed a 
negative effect on both service and good trade. In addition, because of the interaction term of 
TLA and institutional distance, the difference in institutional quality reduced the effect of TLA 
on trade. 
The following sections proceed as follows. Section 1 reviews previous studies 
conducted for similar topics. Section 2 describes the sources of the dataset that used for 
analyses. In Section 3, we discuss the methodological aspect of the gravity model of trade. 
Section 4 represents the results of empirical analysis. Finally, in the conclusion section, we 
finalise with the summary of the analysis. 
 
1. Literature review 
The literature includes a variety of previous studies that have been investigating the 
effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) on bilateral trade; heterogeneous effects of FTA's and 
also how institutional gaps among countries are affecting their bilateral trade volumes as well 
as the role of service trade in overall global trade in comparison with good trade. FTAs facilitate 
international economic cooperation and help trading partners develop common approaches to 
trade and investment. As depicted in the Baier et al. (2019) paper, many of these deals have 
expressed the intention of pursuing "deep" integration, that is, economic integration that 
extends above tariff reduction and reaches into policies. 
There already exists an extensive literature analysis related to how FTA affects trade 
flows. In a study by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), as a result of the gravity equation using 
differenced panel data in 1996-2000, it is found that an FTA will increase the bilateral trade 
between two participants after ten years. At the same time, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and 
Baier et al. (2014) detect that membership in FTA raises the bilateral trade flow by 60%. Baier 
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et al.( 2019) find that the average effect of FTAs is 49.3%. Kohl (2014) states that while only 
44 out of 166 agreements (26.5%) tend to be trade-boosting, 16 out of 166 trade deals had 
adverse effects. However, in the Baier et al. (2019) study, it is found that using Poisson PML 
instead of using OLS compare to Kohl (2014) and taking into consideration heteroscedasticity 
of trade data and other factors, 57% of trade agreements had an indisputable positive effect. 
Specifically, Caporale et al. (2009) shed light on the impact of FTAs on trade flows between 
Central and Eastern European Countries-4(i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and 
European Union-15 countries by estimating gravity equation. To gain unbiased coefficients 
and identify the effect of time-invariant variables, they addressed using fixed-effect vector 
decomposition (FEVD) technique. The findings show that FTAs have a significantly positive 
effect on trade flows. To check the robustness of the effect of FTAs on trade, they included 
three transition countries (Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine) in the sample as a control 
group, which did not sign a trade agreement with the EU. As a result of the analysis, 14% more 
trade is observed between EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries, which have signed FTAs compared 
to three transitional countries that did not sign with EU-15.  
Moreover, Cipollina & Salvatici( 2010) show that ex-post empiric assessments of the 
FTA impact on bilateral trade flows are precise, which is based on meta-analysis, an increment 
in trade is confirmed to be around 40%. Another meta-analysis by Head and Mayer (2014) 
finds that FTAs, on average, are correlated with a rise in trade flow of 80%, outperforming the 
influence of factors such as common language and contiguity.  
In some studies, it is concluded that the impacts of "deep" integrated trade agreements 
on aggregate trade flow are more notable than "shallow" agreements (Cipollina & Salvatici, 
2010; Baier, Bergstrand and Feng 2014; Kohl,2014; Baier, Yotov and Zylkin 2019). Moreover, 
Baier et al. (2014) state that there is a larger impact of FTAs while taking into consideration 
distinctive types of trade agreements with deeper integration. In the studies of Carrère (2006); 
Kohl (2014), it is documented that individual FTAs, including those that seem to be alike, may 
have vastly distinct effects on trade. In general, heterogeneity between FTAs is analysed in 
some research papers and while comparing trade effects. Baier et al. (2019) describe 908 
specific estimates of the impact of FTAs on various trading pairs for the 1986–2006 period 
using ex-post analysis, and they identify that approximately ⅔ part of heterogeneity exists 
within FTA rather than across due to asymmetric influences between pairs which often have a 
significant role to play. Baier et al. (2019) conclude that having an asymmetry effect of FTAs 
among partners within given sectors. Zylkin (2016)  focuses on NAFTA and empirically states 
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that “The magnitude heterogeneity in FTA effects can vary significantly from what we would 
predict based solely on tariffs because disparities in partner countries' levels of growth have 
played a significant role”. 
Baier et al. (2014, 2018) state that the trade elasticities correlated with trade 
liberalisations are heterogeneous in terms of variable cost and fixed-cost trade elasticities. They 
show that a 10% decrease in per capita income of a bilateral country is correlated with a 60% 
increase in the partial trade agreement effect. Because of this evidence, compared to developed 
countries, less developed countries are expected to profit more from FTA, owing to a 
significant decrease in policy export fixed costs. At the same time, they prove that the 
heterogeneity of economic integration agreements (EIA) is explaining 99% of the EIA effect 
between 1,358 North-North, North-South, and South-South bilateral countries. Furthermore, a 
study by Kohl et al. (2016) is depicted that trade agreement heterogeneity does matter in 
understanding the effect of FTAs on foreign trade using a gravity model. Using 296 agreements 
and 17 policy domains, including WTO and WTOX provision, they state that governments sign 
substantive trade agreements are favourably linked to their level of economic growth, and the 
number of WTO participants in a trade agreement and its robustness are related. Compared to 
other studies, the heterogeneity of trade agreement elasticities and their correlations with 
distance are investigated through product categories (Freeman & Pienknagura, 2019). They 
explore that the impact of TA on intermediates goods is more than non-intermediates (total 
goods), and there is a negative effect on the correlation between EIA and distance for non-
intermediates.  
Cheong et al. (2015) emphasise in their study how the benefit from a PTA is determined 
by heterogeneity in size, revenue, and location. They find evidence that similar countries in 
terms of size, location, and income while joining into a PTA have a more significant relative 
impact on trade flows.  
There are fewer studies on the effect of FTAs on specific industries. Mainly in the 
literature, effects of FTAs in agricultural sectors have been depicted (Sun & Reed, 2010; 
Vollrath et al., 2009). Few researchers have looked at the situation of the service trade market 
in greater depth. Kox & Lejour (2005) focus on how service trade is hampered by regulatory 
heterogeneity. Through taking into consideration 2001 bilateral service trades between EU 
members, they show evidence that because of the fixed-cost boundary impacts that regulatory 
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heterogeneity between two countries causes, it has no positive effect on bilateral service 
exchange. 
According to Chen et al. (2006) study, services and goods are considered as one-way 
complements. While good trade is required for consumer consumption, services are not 
compulsory. Some older authors, such as  Hill (1977), argue that since services cannot be 
retained, a service exchange requires both participants to be present simultaneously and 
preferably in the same place. While according to Melvin (1989), this approach is invalidated 
or at the very least necessitates a redefinition of, the rule of comparative advantage for service 
trade. As depicted, this perspective becomes inadequate for many contemporary services (e.g. 
digital services) that do not need the supplies and client to be physically at the same place. On 
the other hand, some older scholars emphasise the resemblances between goods and services 
trade. For instance, according to Hindley & Smith (1984), none of the distinctions between 
services and goods trading alters the conceptual ramifications of current theoretical concepts. 
In the last ten years of empirical work on services trade, to evaluate the determinants 
of bilateral services trade, all of the researchers use the gravity model. The first analyses to use 
the latest OECD data collection on bilateral trade in services to determine the indicators of 
bilateral trade in services were (Grünfeld, 2003; Kimura & Lee, 2006; Mirza & Nicoletti, 2011). 
Grünfeld (2003) observed a significant home market impact in the service trade. He stated that 
increased service trading is not facilitated by free trade agreements much more than trade in 
good. Mirza and Nicoletti (2011) proposed that trade in services differs from trade in 
commodities significantly. They suggested that in the trade services, inputs from the exporting 
and importing countries are required. Moreover, they observed that bilateral good trade is 
stronger than the service trade. The explanation was that as the production results from a series 
of integrated activities carried out in both the exporting and importing countries if one of the 
latter is not performed flawlessly, the quality of the whole chain suffers. They emphasised that 
bilateral trade service is influenced by labour and infrastructure costs in partner countries. 
Afterwards, an empirical study by Lennon et al.(2009) demonstrates that some of these factors 
also have a common impact on bilateral good trade. 
In addition to the literature, Kimura and Lee (2006), Francois and Hoekman (2010) 
demonstrated the comparison between service and good trade while studying the gravity 
equation in the international service. By using  10 OECD member countries as "home 
countries" and 47 OECD member and nonmembers countries as a "partner" for the years 1999 
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and 2000, (Kimura & Lee, 2006) found that the effect of trade agreements on exports of service 
is more significant than for the exports of goods, which suggests that the gravity equation deals 
well for services trade than it does with good trade. At the same time, in terms of elasticity of 
explanatory variables, geographical distance turned to be more significantly positive for service 
trade than good trade, while the common borderland dummy is highly significant for bilateral 
good trade compared to service trade. On the other hand, Head et al. (2009) predicted similar 
estimations for products and services exchange and identified comparable elasticity figures. By 
doing model estimation for various service categories, they depicted that distance results for 
offshore able service groups are statistically and economically significant in a sample period. 
Head, Mayer, and Ries also demonstrated that common language, colonial link variables that 
can be found in the trade gravity equation leads to a rise of both service and good trade. 
Contractor and Mudambi (2008) discovered that human capital variables match marginally 
better for goods exports than for service exports as a result of the survey of 25 trade services 
countries. However, it is expected that human capital output will be more relevant for service 
exports. 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the service trade is studied by some researchers 
(Deardorff, 2001; Francois & Hoekman, 2010; Kimura & Lee, 2006). The result of Francois 
and Hoekman, 2010 study is similar to the contributions on goods trade. They found 
considerable evidence that service liberalisation is a potentially significant source of economic 
performance gains, including gains in industrial competitiveness and the coordination of 
operations both between and within companies.  The application by Kimura and Lee (2006) 
shows that economic freedom has a favourable impact on all goods and services trading, but 
the effect on services trade is much greater.  
Besides other studies, Deardorff (2001) emphasised that service trade liberalisation has 
a role to play in fostering not only trade in services and yet also in a good trade. According to 
Deardorff, to complete and enhance global agreements, international trade in goods 
necessitates inputs from a variety of service sectors such as transport, finance, insurance. 
However, there is a restriction for service providers to supply these services to other countries 
across borders, including foreign countries imposes extra costs and obstacles to international 
trade. Therefore, by encouraging good trade, trade liberalisation in services will produce more 
significant gains than one would anticipate from a study of just the services trade. Ariu et al. 
(2019) also supported this conception that he suggested that the liberalisation in the service 
trade would lead to having a significant impact on goods trade in general. 
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Furthermore, another factor that plays a notable role on trade volume is the institutional 
qualities of trade partners. 'Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic, and social interaction' (North,1996).  This term is as general as to include 
informal and formal constraints for which customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, laws, and 
property rights might be good examples. At the same time, the quality of economic policies 
and institutions is not the same in all countries, whether they are ruled by different or similar 
regimes. There can be different reasons for the difference in the quality of institutions (Clague 
et al., 1996). Ali (2002) revealed that nations with higher degrees of economic development 
have significantly higher degrees of the rule of law, low levels of corruption, compelling 
bureaucracy, and effective security provision over private property. 
Large effects of local institutional conditions on development directions in various parts 
of the world have widely been accepted (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Álvarez et al., 2018; 
Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, 2006). It is an undeniable fact that poor governance may result in 
higher transaction costs in most cases, which will negatively affect the economic growth of the 
country as well as its integration into international trade. According to Hall and Jones (1997), 
weak institutions may lead to redirection of trade and overproduction of goods and, in this 
manner, lower the degree of economic activities.   
Institutions are one of the sources of comparative advantage in trade, while the 
outcomes of institutional comparative advantage are regularly uncertain (Álvarez et al., 2018; 
Levchenko, 2007; Nunn & Trefler, 2014) checked the effects of national institutional quality 
over bilateral sectoral trade flows. They used bilateral trade data of tangible goods from the 
UN Comtrade database as well as the GeoDist database for variables like distances between 
countries, common official language, and colonial ties in the past. In conclusion, they found 
out confirmation for the theory saying institutional quality impacts trade, whether or not we 
are thinking of the institutional nature of the importing country or the institutional distance 
between the importing and exporting nations. Better institutional quality in the importing 
country facilitates two-sided exchange, and this outcome is built up when the institutional 
distance with the exporter expands for the importing country. Therefore, their outcomes affirm 
the theory on the ease of trading with countries having higher quality institutions. Freeman 
(2002) has also analysed institutional differences among different OECD member countries 
and their effects on economic performances using data from 1970 until 2000. The main findings 
of this paper were as follows: Firstly, countries with a higher quality of institutions became 
more market-friendly in the period from when all the institutional contrasts were minimalised. 
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Secondly, differences between institutions of labour markets, product markets, and capital 
markets are almost similar to those in economic freedom. The final finding is the best 
institutional structure has resulted from advanced capitalism. The outcome for the developed 
OECD nations varies enormously from similar investigations of the connection among quality 
of institutions and results for developing countries. 
Groot and Linders (2004), in their paper, has also checked the effect of quality of 
institutions over trade volumes using gravity modelling. They have added and primarily 
focused on some variables such as the relevance of quality of governance and the extent of 
similarity of institutions of countries. In particular, it has been checked whether homogeneity 
and quality of institutions autonomously affect the trade level among country pairs. One of the 
main findings was countries having similar institutional systems result in 13% more bilateral 
trade volume on average. The authors also concluded that an increase of one standard deviation 
in the overall quality of institutions from the mean would prompt an expected increase between 
30-44% in two-sided trade. Furthermore, in Méon and Sekkat (2008) paper, it is examined to 
what degree various components of institutional systems can influence the total amount of 
exports as well as exports of manufactured and non-manufactured goods. For this analysis, they 
have used panel countries from 1990 until 2000. As a result, it is found out that in the case of 
manufactured goods, there is a positive correlation with the institutional quality while the 
exports of non-manufactured goods were showing a negative correlation and total exports did 
not seem to be affected by the quality of the institutional framework. 
The other authors - Jansen and Nordås (2011), analysed the influence of domestic 
institutions on the trade levels. Two modern methods were used in their paper, which included 
concentrating mainly on total trade volumes and focusing on the bilateral trades using gravity 
equations. The result was a positive relationship between the quality of domestic institutions 
and the extent of openness of the country. It was also clear from their analyses that domestic 
tariffs alone do not have a significant effect on trade volume, but when it is combined with 
high institutional quality, then it can have some undeniable effects. Additionally, some positive 
effects by domestic institutions were observed on bilateral trades. However, parameters of 
institutional factors are decreased nearly by half, and it can turn to be irrelevant when the 
quality of domestic institutions is also included in the analyses. 
In today's world, a positive indicator of the Rule of Law is a sign of a better way of 
governance in any country, and it is considered as a crucial condition for economic and social 
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growth, as well as for democracy (Valcke, 2012). The concept of the rule of law refers to the 
supremacy of the law over political activity and human behaviour. That is equivalent to a case 
in which both the government and people are constrained by the legislation to follow it. Quality 
of legal institutions in importer country plays undoubtedly large effect in international trade 
too. The majority of recent studies have concentrated on this, which  Yu et al. (2015) identified 
that in case there is a less mature legal system in the importer country than that of the exporter, 
there will be some confusions over the risk of future expropriation and default, and the 
exporters bear the main risk. Furthermore, Yu et al. (2015) investigated the idea of a connection 
between formal and informal institutions-trust and legal framework are classified as informal 
and formal, respectively – and show that trust and the rule of law are substitutes as the effect 
of the rule of law increases in importer country relative to exporter country the impact of trust 
on bilateral trade decreases. Similarly, According to Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), low 
quality of institutions can create a barrier for bilateral trades as much as tariffs can do. They 
discovered that trade could dramatically increase when there is a solid regulatory mechanism 
capable of upholding business transactions by formulating and executing the economic policy 
of government consistently and transparently. In support of this idea, countries with stronger 
contract compliance may effectively specialise in manufacturing products that require 
relationship-specific investments (Antras et al., 2007). 
There is very few literature focusing on the relationship between international trade 
volumes and political stability. As an example for the old scholar, Srivastava et al. (1986) 
examined the effects of political stability on foreign trade that discovered countries with higher 
political stability measures export more, while countries with lower political stability consume 
more. Domestic political instability in a country, according to Sambanis (2002), decreases the 
trust of foreign investors and trade partners. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), after analysing 
the effects of different violence types, conclude that terrorism, internal and external war may 
result in necessary macroeconomic consequences in terms of bilateral trade. They state that 
insecurity inside countries plays a secret tax role in trade, increasing the price of imports and 
putting these countries at a competitive disadvantage. Davies (2008) demonstrates that the 
economic costs of war remain even after it finishes because the war causes high inflation, and 
high inflation triggers capital movement from the unstable areas. On the other hand, Rotunno 
(2016) found in his study that countries tend to sign FTAs, when there is high political 
instability after their leader's withdrawal for unanticipated reasons, such as natural death or ill 
health. His estimations suggest that the probability of entering the same trade agreement is 
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twice as high as the average after these types of unpredictable incidents. “The effect is more 
pronounced for FTAs signed with big trading partners, which are more likely to destroy 
protectionist rents” (Rotunno, 2016, p.147). 
In summary, according to the extensive literature, there is a positive influence of trade 
agreements on trade. In contrast, the more recent gravity literature on services trade shows 
some similarities and differences in services and goods trade, but conclusions are mixed. From 
institutional quality aspects, most scholars agree in the idea of having similar institutional 
systems increase bilateral trade volume on average. Our contribution to the vast literature is 
primarily the following.  Firstly, we examine how FTAs affect trade volume in the service and 
good trade. Besides this, we shed light on how trade agreements between countries with 
different institutional quality affect bilateral service and good trade.  
2. Data 
For our empirical analysis, data is used from various sources. Our final dataset covers 
bilateral trade flow for 43 countries1 between 2004-2015 years. There was not enough data for 
selected countries' service trade in particular for the years before 2004. Overall, the list of 
countries covered in our analysis consists of both OECD and non-OECD countries. Previous 
empirical findings indicate that the factors influencing trade flows can vary greatly between 
developed and transitional countries (Eicher and Henn 2011; Martinez-Zarzoso, Felicitas, and 
Horsewood 2009). However, analysis for developed and transitional countries is not 
widespread in the literature. Therefore, by choosing eight non-OECD countries from 
transitional nations, we addressed this gap.    
We use bilateral service imports trade from the newly released OECD statistics on 
foreign trade services as the dependent variable. The OECD data on service imports 
compromised all 43 countries as "home countries" and "partners countries". As it is analysed 
in Kimura and Lee (2006) study, we have also compared service trade and good trade imports. 
Service trade is defined as all total of all types of service within considering years. A total good 
trade is defined as the sum of all unidirectional flows of goods.  
                                                          
 
 
1 See Appendix A for a list of countries used in the analysis 
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Most of the dependent variable data - GDP of import and export countries, bilateral 
distance, and dummy variables originated from CEPII database (CEPII, 2019) and recognised 
crucial source data for gravity analysis, which is publicly available. The bilateral distance 
measure we use distij is the distance in between each countries` most populous cities. It is 
measured using the great circle method, as defined by (Mayer and Zignago, 2012), based on 
the latitudes and longitudes of a country's most significant agglomerations. 
In gravity analysis as for the dummy variables consist of "Colony" indicates all country-
pairs with a colonial history, "Contiguity" indicates contiguous borders between home and 
partner countries, "Language" indicates the existence of a common language between import 
and export countries, additionally, "Island", "Landlocked" and "Common Currency". In 
comparison to other studies, the population of import and export countries data also are 
considered in our analysis, which is taken from the CEPII database. The variable "TLA" 
includes all trade-liberalising agreements such as Customs Union, Free Trade Agreement, 
Partial Scope Agreement, Economic Integration Agreement, Customs Union & Economic 
Integration Agreement, Free Trade Agreement & Economic Integration Agreement, and Partial 
Scope & Economic Integration Agreement. In more specifically, Customs Union and 
Economic Integration Agreement dummy variable was also added in our analysis separately in 
a more deep analysis. TLA dummy variable data originate from Mario Larch's Regional Trade 
Agreements Database2. All dummy variables are considered within each pair of countries 
because they can constitute related enablers/barriers to bilateral trade. The name of TLAs 
covers the 2004-2015 period is demonstrated in Appendix G.  
In our research, we also investigate the role of institutions in facilitating or impeding 
trade, and we test whether better institutions facilitate bilateral trade. From a data usage 
perspective, in the literature, to analyse the institutional role on the trade trust indicators by 
Eurobarometer, alternative datasets about institutional quality have been addressed (De Groot 
et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005). However, we prefer to utilise the World Bank data set, which 
is the most comprehensive and representative one that has been addressed by (Álvarez et al., 
2018) paper. The World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) assess institutional 
quality at the country level developed by (Kaufmann et al., 2011). However, not without 
                                                          
 
 
2 https://www.ewf.uni-bayreuth.de/en/research/RTA-data/index.html  
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dispute, the World Governance Index (WGI) is probably the most accurate and globally 
extensive collection of institutional indices available. The World Governance Index (WGI) 
offers six governance indices for 215 economies from 1996 to 2019, covering various facets of 
institutional quality at the state level. It has a spectrum of -2.5 to +2.5, with higher scores 
indicating improved governance. In our analysis, we addressed to following two indicators out 
of six:  
1. The rule of law (RL) – this concept encompasses public trust in the justice system. 
Contract protection, private property rights, and law enforcement towards violence and 
criminal activities, and national sovereignty are also examples of the rule of law 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) - measures public 
expectations of the risk that the regime will be destabilised or overthrown by 
illegitimate means and aggressive actions, such as politically motivated violence and 
terrorism, are also included in this concept. In general, higher political stability and 
lower violence are expected to increase trade. 
            In our sample data, while there are 21672 observations (=42x43x12), 1008 observations 
(4, 65%) are missing. Therefore, in this article, the solution to the missing data problem is to 
consider all missing values as zero trade. In our sample, we did not face that many missing 
trade volumes between pairs may cause severe biases in the analyses, which we considered all 
missing values as zero trade. In comparison to good trade, which has 108 zero observations, 
there are no zeros in service import trade data. In Table 1, descriptive statistics of all dependent 
and independent variables can be seen.  
Figure 1: Relationship between differences in the rule of law and trade depending on TLA
    




To understand the relationship between institutional indicators and trade, we plotted the 
following Figures. By addressing twoway lfitci command3, we are showing a calculation of 
simple linear regression of service and good trade on the level of difference in the rule of law 
and plots of resulting line, along with a confidence interval. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
relationship between differences in the rule of law and volume of trade in service and good for 
two scenarios:  
 countries participating in the same TLA; 
 country pairs not having any trade agreements 
As seen from graphs, participating in the same trade liberalisation agreements stabilises 
the negative relationship between the gap in country pairs' Rule of Law system and their 
bilateral trade volumes for both service and good. 
The same plotting has been done to observe the relationship between the difference in 
political stability indicators and trade-in service and good. Graphs in Figure 2 for service and 
good trade separately shows how the relation of difference in political stability and trade 
volume is varying based on TLA. By plotting these graphs, we can display that as the difference 
increases in the political stability indicator of country pairs, the volume of service and good 
trade decreases noticeably, and we can observe this effect much for countries having TLA. 
Figure 2: Relationship between differences in political stability and trade depending on TLA
   
Source: Compiled by authors 
                                                          
 
 
3See https://www.stata.com/manuals/g-2graphtwowaylfitci.pdf for a broader explanation.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Log_Service IM  21,672 5.05 2.35 -2.89  24.57 
Log_Good EX 21,672 5.82 2.79 -8.76    22.52 
Independent Variables      
Log GDP IM 21,668 19,55 1,78 14,77 23.61 
Log GDP EX 21,588 19.56 1,77 14,79 23,73 
Log Distance 21,590 7,99 1,10 4,09 9,88 
Log Population IM 21,668 9,59 1,62 5,67 14,13 
Log Population EX 21,588 9,60 1,63 5,67 14,13 
Language 21,508 0,05 0,21 0 1 
Colony 21,508 0,02 0,13 0 1 
Contiguity 20,664 0,06 0,25 0 1 
TLA 21,672 0,54 0,50 0 1 
CU 21,672 0,03 0,16 0 1 
EIA 21,672 0,31 0,47 0 1 
Landlocked 21,672 0,28 0,45 0 1 
Institutional indicators 











Rule of Law Exporter 21,672 0,92 0,92 -1,33 2,1 
Political stability Importer 21,672 0,50 0,74 -2,02 1,62 
Political stability Exporter 21,672 0,50 0,74 -2,02 1,62 
Difference in Rule of law(log)  21,672 1,05 0,81 -9 1,42 
Difference in Political 
stability(log) 
21,672 0,82 0,66 -9 1.35 
Source: Compiled by authors 
In Appendix B and C, the relation between the importer rule of law, political stability 
and trade is plotted in the same way with Figure 2 and 3. As the quality of the rule of law and 
political stability in importer country increase, a rise in the service and good trade can be 
observed. The relationship between service trade and importer country's institutional indicators 
is stronger than good and institutional indicators relationship.  
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3. Methodology: The gravity model of trade 
3.1 Brief description about gravity equation 
The methodological research is based on the trade gravity model that has become a 
well-known method for ex-post trade analysis. An economist Jan Tinbergen firstly introduced 
the gravity equation model in 1962. Being influenced by Newtonian gravitation theory, the 
equation is mainly used for calculating predictions on bilateral trade flows between countries 
considering their economic sizes, which can be shown as GDP or GDP per capita of countries 
and geographical distances between them: 
 
The gravity model also has a multiplicative form as described in its standard version as 
followed: 
 
In this equation, 
denotes the monetary value of exports from country i to country j,  while 
is all importer-specific factors making up the total importer's demand, and   
  all exporter-specific factors make up the total exporter's supply (such as the exporter's 
GDP).  G is standing for a vector independent of country pairs, such as the degree of 
global trade liberalization.  
Despite having very stable results in bilateral trade volumes calculation, the gravity 
model did not have any theoretical basis until the first attempt (Anderson et al., 1979). His 
work was mainly based on Armington's Assumption stating that all the goods of a country will 
be consumed by every other country participating in international trade processes at least in a 
minimal amount. This was believed to be the reason why larger countries are importing and 
exporting more goods than smaller ones. After not an extended period, Helpman (1987) and 
Bergstrand (1990) brought a new perspective to the model, claiming that goods can be 
distinguished between producers. Moreover, it has been depicted that firm heterogeneity is 
taking into account in the gravity model. In addition, a crucial contribution has been made by 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) paper, where it is indicated that having control over trade 




3.2 Model specification 
Developing an effective gravity model for scientific study necessitates taking into 
account a variety of econometric considerations. The econometric methods for estimating this 
model have advanced over time, like the theoretical side of the gravity model. Given the 
multiplicative structure of the gravity equation, the conventional method for calculating one is, 
by using ordinary least square estimations, taking natural logarithms of the variables, then 
generating a log-linear equation. In comparison with using a single cross-section, the use of 
panel data (over time bilateral trade data) is required for determining the effect of non-constant 
variables has advantageous. However, it can cause various econometrics issues. Estimates in 
panel data are biased and contradictory because there is a correlation between unmeasurable 
object-specific effects and exogenous variables. 
Another problem is the causal link between trade policy and trade flows, as expanded 
bilateral trade could not be the outcome of a Free Trade Agreement (Kohl, 2014). At the same 
time, not taking called multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) into account can lead to some 
problems. MRT is the trade obstacle that each nation faces with its trading partners (Adam & 
Cobham, 2007). Historically, the very first method was to use remoteness terminology to 
represent multilateral resistance. There are some different ways to tackle issues related to 
MTRs. One approach is to use the iterative methodology to generate forecasts of the price-
raising impact of bilateral trade barriers (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2003). However, since it 
necessitates the use of non-linear least squares (NLS) to achieve an approximation, this 
technique is not often used. One commonly used approach is to use country-fixed effects for 
importers and exporters (Luhman, 2006; Feenstra, 2002). These importer and exporter 
dummies are binary (0,1) variables that absorb all country-specific features while still adjusting 
for a country's average amount of imports and exports.  
Moreover, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recognizes the difficulties involved with a lack 
of sufficient exogenous or instrumental variables. Unlike other studies, they utilize country-
time-specific and country-pair fixed effects on the gravity equation to addressed MRTs and 
country-specific heterogeneity. In addition, panel data is used to reduce the bias caused by 
country heterogeneity in our analysis. The reason is that though observed country-pair 
characteristics (such as shared language and common currency) can only adjust for country-
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pair tendency to trade in a standard cross-section, country-pair heterogeneity in panel data can 
be accounted for by using country-pair fixed results. 
The gravity model used in this article takes the following basic form: 
(1) 
 
Equation (1) would be estimated separately for service import and good import three 
times, firstly without fixed effect, secondly with importer and exporter fixed effect, then with 
an importer, exporter dummy, year, and pair fixed effect. In the equation, 𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 is the value 
of unidirectional flow from country i to country j in a year t. 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑠𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 is the dependent variable, 
a logarithmic form of service import, and good import between partner countries i j at the time 
t. 
The literature on gravity models considers three factors being used as indicators of a 
country's size Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP per capita (GDP per capita), and 
population. In this paper, GDP and population are included which are represented by 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 for home country, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑗, 𝑡  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑗, 𝑡 for partner country. 
Since the effect of GDP on overall services exchange is not straightforward, the GDP 
coefficient is supposed to take either a positive or a negative symbol. However, a rise in either 
partner countries` GDP would result in higher in the two countries' services trade flow since 
this country would consume more services and generate and export more services as it became 
wealthier. Second, the model includes time-invariant measurable variables that can influence 
trading costs frequently used in research of the gravity model of trade (Kohl, 2014). Since the 
greater geographical distance between trading partners implies higher trade costs, bilateral 
distance 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑗 is assumed to not have a positive coefficient. It could be reasonable for 
good trade; however, the latest research does not suggest that this is the case with service.  
As regards dummy variables, the 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑗 set equal to 1 for landlocked countries, 
and it is expected to be negative for good trade but could not expect to indicated for service 
trade precisely. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑗 implies that if a trade flow that is taking place between two 
countries is contiguous, it equal to one. In addition to distance, a shared language and 
community are expected transaction costs, thus increasing bilateral trade. To account for such 
linguistic links, we introduce a dummy variable 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑗 for countries with the same 
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language. The dummy variable 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 𝑖𝑗  refers to a relationship between two nations, 
regardless of their degree of growth, in which one has dominated the other for a long time or 
possesses historical colonial tie and set equal to 1. Both three dummy variables are supposed 
to be positive.  𝑇𝐿𝐴𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 dummy variable represents all trade liberalization agreements and set 
equal to 1 if the trade flow among countries i and j which accrued in t year is the part of the 
same trade agreement and expected to be positive. In our paper, we also plan to analyze 
specifically with the dummy variables 𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 the trade flow among countries j 
and i, which accrued in year t, is the part of the same Customs Union and Economic integrated 
agreements. 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑟𝑙𝑤 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡  variables indicate the difference between the 
institutional indicators – the rule of law and political stability - of the home i and partner 
countries j, respectively. This indicator does not lead to symmetry issues between i and j 
countries, taking their absolute values. In addition to institutional difference indicators, we also 
include two interaction terms such  𝑇𝐿𝐴 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑟𝑙𝑤 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐿𝐴 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓. 𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 to 
evaluate how institutional difference indicators (for the rule of law and political stability) 
influence on the effect of TLA on trade flow of service and reasonable. 
Explicitly, to estimate the impact of TLA on both services and product trades, we use 
institutional distance as the distinction between importer and exporter country governance 
indicators and an interaction term between institutional distance and TLA parameter. Besides 
that, to see more valuable results, we examined the impact of institutional efficiency on trade 
based on importer levels of governance indicators: the rule of law and political stability. A 
baseline level of 0 is used to define the effect for developed and transitional countries separately. 
 Øi, t and Øj, t  Indicates the importer-year and exporter-year dummy variables. These two 
fixed effects include both observable and unobservable country-specific features, being island 
country variables typically used in the standard gravity model. Finally, 𝑢 𝑖𝑗, 𝑡 represents the 
error term. A description of all variables is demonstrated in Appendix D. 
The basic OLS approach would have considerable limitations when estimating a gravity 
model. Firstly, a drawback of OLS estimation is that it cannot adjust the information for the 
zero trade flows, as the trade value is converted into a logarithmic form, these zero observations 
are removed from measurement samples. Substitute missing value with small arbitrary can 
cause inefficient estimation. One of the approaches for dealing with this issue is simply 
removing the country pairs with zero trades and doing calculations with the same model, while 
the others added +1 for all dependent variables with zero values. Although these approaches 
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can solve the issues from the technical side, in general, they will result in not negligible 
inconsistencies of the main parameters. Helpman et al. (2008) introduce Tobit, The Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein (HMR) model. However, in the end, it turned to be inefficient on the 
panel data. To account for the existence of zero trade flows, the gravity model is approximated 
in multiplicative rather than logarithmic form, as mentioned by Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006), applying the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) model. Luckily, in our 
sample, we did not face many zero trade volumes between pairs may cause severe biases in the 
analyses. 
The second problem that arises from OLS is the Heteroscedasticity of trade data 
because it leads to the impact of trade cost and policy to become not only biased also unreliable 
while estimating the gravity model in log-linear form. A comprehensive approach to PPML is 
presented by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to tackle this issue. In the recently published 
studies, PPML has emerged as a preferred estimation methodology, and particularly in the 
sector focus data, it becomes a primary tool by Mujahid and Kalkuhl (2016), Sun and Reed 
(2010). Another most significant challenge we can face in the OLS is the endogeneity problem. 
While estimating trade policy effects in the gravity model, some variables could be 
endogeneous, and the reason could be the correlation of trade variables with unobservable trade 
costs. In the many kinds of literature, this problem is recognized by many researchers. For 
instance, (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007) addressed this issue with standard instrumental variable 
(IV) treatments; after that, they suggest applying the average treatment effect (ATE) method 
in panel data. In particular, they addressed using the country-pair fixed effect to eliminate this 
endogeneity issue. While applying the country-pair fixed effect will absorb bilateral time-
invariant variables such as distance, it will not suppress the effect of time-varying variables. In 
addition, As shown by (Egger & Nigai, 2015), including a pair-fixed effect is the more optimal 
way of tackling the endogeneity problem in the gravity model. Therefore, in our analysis, in 
addition to OLS, we also imply PPML estimation. 
The following two equations are PPML estimations. We estimate PPML two times, 












The second equation is almost the same as the first one. Instead of taking logarithmic 
of dependant variable in that case service and good import, we find exponential of the equation. 
In the third equation, while we added the country-pair fixed effect, all the time-invariant 
variables such as distance, landlocked, contiguity, language, a colony will be absorbed.  
In the empirical analysis, firstly, classic OLS estimation is analyzed separately for 
service and good import without any fixed effect within emphasizing the effect of institutional 
differences such as the rule of law and political stability and interaction of them with TLA on 
the trade flow. The latter we realized the same evaluation considering importer, exporter and 
year fixed effect with OLS and recently recognized PPML and including country pair effect 
PPML estimation to obtain more adequate results.  
4. Results of empirical analysis. 
This section discusses the result of the analysis that determines the effect of Trade 
Liberalization Agreements, which include all kinds of free trade agreements on the service and 
good trade separately. Moreover, we also interpret the influence of institutional governance 
indicators: the rule of law and political stability on the service and good trade from two aspects: 
first, how trade agreements between countries with different levels of the rule of law and 
political stability affects the bilateral service and good trade. Second, how institutional distance 
and the interaction term between institutional distance and TLA variable affect trade. 
4.1 The effect of TLA on service and good trade in a comparative way within other 
control measures. 
First, we perform a simple OLS regression analysis in the gravity model without a fixed 




Table 2.        
OLS analysis without fixed effect 
                                   OLS   
       Service trade        Good trade 
GDP import (log)  0.901***   (0.00816)                          0.625***     (0.0125) 
GDP export (log)  0.928***   (0.00910)                         0.852***     (0.0117) 
Distance (log) -0.836***   (0.01000) -0.949***     (0.0132) 
Landlocked -0.010         (0.0157)  0.006           (0.0238) 
Contiguity  0.370***   (0.0291)  0.419***     (0.0397) 
Language  0.651***   (0.0342)  0.598***     (0.0412) 
Colony  0.318***   (0.0599)  0.154*         (0.0654) 
Population  import 
(log) 
-0.114***   (0.00973)  0.340***     (0.0140) 
Population export 
(log) 
-0.199***   (0.00927)  0.089***   (0.0120) 
TLA 
CU  
EIA       
-0.0221       (0.0263) 
-0.151***   (0.0422) 
-0.131***   (0.0245) 
 0.275***     (0.0345) 
 0.187***     (0.0455) 
 0.314***     (0.0342) 
Constant -21.04***   (0.166)                         -19.93***     (0.238) 
Observation            20495               20388 
adj. R-sq                                  0.803                                                         0.729          
Notes: 
(i) Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(iii) Model is without fixed effect 
(iv) OLS: ordinary least squares 
Source: authors` calculations 
As can be seen from Table 2 first OLS analysis without fixed effects has shown quite 
expected results in most variables with adjusted R-Squares being equal to 0.803 and 0.729. It 
seems normal since we have minimal zero trade levels between sample countries. Looking at 
Table 2, we can see that the effect of TLA, which is one of our main variables. TLA has an 
even larger effect in a good trade with 31% than the effect on service trade, which we calculated 
in the following way: [exp(0.275)-1]. At the same time, the estimated TLA effects in OLS 
without fixed effect estimation for service are insignificant. Being in the same trade 
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liberalization agreements stimulated goods trade more rather than service trade. This may be 
the result of not all the services being included in all kinds of trade liberalization agreements. 
Moreover, in free trade zones where service trade has been liberalized, there are 
obstacles to service trade (Grünfeld, 2003). It is concluded that TLAs are still not firmly 
effective in eliminating barriers against service imports. Understandably, service trade cannot 
be quickly and directly targeted by tariffs or taxes of governments (Francois & Hoekman, 2010). 
The other trade agreement dummies, such as Customs Union and Economic Integration 
Agreement gave us negative results for the same trade type, which can be explained by the 
deficiency in precision caused by not adding fixed effects.  
The following text is mainly about the effect of control variables on trade. In both trade 
types, we got positive relation with the economic size of countries, which is represented by the 
GDP of importer and exporter countries. Trade on services is affected comparably more by 
economic well-being, which would mean that economically stronger nations will use more 
services offered by other countries.  Results for another variable is a population of country 
pairs can also be considered as a representative for economic size did not meet the expectations 
showing negative correlations in case of service imports, and positive but considerably smaller 
scores in case of good trade. The results for geographical distance between countries is also 
quite rational with negative percentages: [exp(-0.836)-1]= -0.56% and -0.61%. Geographical 
distance can act as a more serious barrier in a good trade, which is similar to previous analysis 
conducted by Kimura and Lee (2006), where they found out the same. According to our OLS 
estimates, historical colonial ties.4 and official common language has a positive role in both 
trade types, the effect of the latter being more significant.   
While taking a look at Table 3, we will compare our estimations based on OLS and 
PPML with an importer, exporter and year fixed effect, in addition, PPML model with a pair-
fixed effect. In the case of without fixed effects, the OLS model, a correlation among treatment 
and unobservable variables ensues biased estimation of outcomes. In comparison, the FE model 
confines the source of bias to time-varying variables that correlate with outcome. In order to 
tackle the issue that arose by heteroscedasticity and serially correlated error and multilateral 
                                                          
 
 
4 Countries have been in the same colony: Post Soviet nations (Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, Estonia, Latvia), The former British colonies (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, United States, 
Australia), Spanish Colonies (Chile, Mexico)  
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trade resistance, we addressed the PPML FE model, and then the PPML pair fixed effect is 
evaluated to deal with the endogeneity problem. 
 
Table 3:  
Total Bilateral Effect of Trade Liberalization Agreements 
                                                   OLS                                          PPML                PPML(pair-fixed)               
 Service trade Good trade Service  Good Service Good 
GDP import (log) 0.397***       
(0.0436)              
0.894***   
(0.0539) 
                                                               
    
GDP export (log) 0.218***       
(0.0418)    
0.281*** 
(0.0652)                                                                 
    
Distance (log) -0.796*** 
(0.0147       
-1.108*** 
(0.0185) 
            
-0.157** 
(0.0229)              
-0.406*** 
(0.0256)                                                                    
  
TLA 0.263***  
(0.0294)                 
0.644*** 
(0.0435)                        
0.752*** 
(0.0736)                             
0.505*** 
(0.0802)                              
0.044 
(0.173)           
0.130** 
(0.0477)    
CU 0.154**  
(0.0479)                 
0.130* 
(0.0629)                          
0.215* 
(0.0980)                          
1.145*** 
(0.0980)            
0.237* 
(0.107)            
0.341*** 
(0.0907)    
EIA 0.209*** 
(0.0339)           
-0.078 
(0.0474)                        
0.585*** 
(0.0817)                        
1.351*** 
(0.114)                                                                    
  
Contiguity 0.549***   
(0.0294)      
0.162*** 
(0.0392)                            
0.664*** 
(0.0424)          
0.337*** 
(0.0440)                                                                    
  
Language 0.254***        
(0.0321) 
0.391***  
(0.0390)                            
0.257*** 
(0.0504)         
0.930***  
(0.0837)                                                                   
  
Colony 0.432***   
(0.0594)                
0.182*** 
(0.0551)                          
-0.096 
(0.0545)                            
-0.133 





(0.247)            
0.056 
(0.380)                                                                                                                                       




(0.229)             
-0.560   
(0.335)                                                                                                                                     





5.047   
(4.932)  
Yes  
No                       
-9.053**  
(3.435)   
Yes 

















Observation 20495 20388 20495 20495 21402 21378 
adj. R-sq 0.869                0.844                     1.0                      1.0                       1.0                       1.0                       
Notes: 
(i) Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(iii) All models include time-varying importer and exporter dummy variables. 
(iv) OLS: ordinary least squares. PPML: Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood  




The OLS FE model in this table is reliable with a contribution of fixed effects, which 
can be seen from adjusted R-squared numbers 0.869 and 0.844, respectively, for services and 
goods trade. According to the OLS estimation (the first 2 columns), TLA has increased average 
bilateral good trade by 90%[exp(0.644-1)], with 0.644 statistically significant coefficients. This 
result supports the estimation of OLS without a fixed effect, which we discussed in Table 2. 
Participating in the same trade agreements enables countries to boost their trade in goods more 
than in service. On the other hand, in service trade, only 30% increase is observed. These 
findings are similar to those from (Álvarez et al., 2018) analysis, in which 23% effect is found. 
The first PPML model shows that service trade flow has increased by 112%, while in a good 
trade, it is 65%. This is similar to Kimura and Lee, (2006) result.  
 The PPML model with a pair-fixed effect provides lower estimates compared to other 
models. There the TLA is associated with 13% increase in a good trade. As the PPML with 
pair-fixed effect focuses on changes within the same country-pair, it is natural that this estimate 
is smaller than those in other models. However, changes in service trade remain statistically 
insignificant.  Although the tariffs on goods trade are applied on a country-by-country basis, 
services trade, instead of tariffs, is subject to technical barriers such as legislation, visa 
procedures, or physical barriers that limit the provision of telecommunication services that 
rarely differentiate between countries. Therefore, signing the TLA matters noticeably more for 
countries while trading goods. In general, different estimations techniques suggests positive 
result in all TLA estimations. 
In the OLS FE model, it can be assumed that the GDP of the importer country has a 
more significant impact compared to the exporter country on both trades, and it is even larger 
in the case of good imports. The same result is observed in the study by Kimura and Lee (2006). 
This is analogous to the results of Grünfeld & Moxnes (2003), who say that there is a strong 
home market impact on service exports, but we cannot reach that interpretation until we analyze 
the implications of the service imports equation.  
According to our OLS estimation with importer and exporter fixed effects, as the 
distance between countries increases, it leads to lower goods trade volume by 67% and services 
trade by 55 %, which is statistically significant. While these values remain slightly lower in 
models tested with PPML, estimates for distance coefficients still have the predicted negative 
signs, consistent with the findings of the article by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In our 
study, geographical distance is consistently more critical for good trade than for service trade. 
This result may indicate that the transport cost for goods trade is "in general" higher than that 
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for tradable services. Compared to other literature, that value equals -0.5 in the Álvarez et al. 
(2018), similar to our study and -0,91 in Head and Mayer ( 2014) study. 
As expected, countries have the same official language trade services 25% more with 
each other compared to the rest countries, and this result is the same for OLS and PPML FE 
estimations. While in the good trade, this percentage is much more, which is associated with 
153% according to the PPML FE model. These findings overlap with the prior empirical studies 
concluding that the impact of variables such as common language is significant with (72%) 
(Head & Mayer, 2014). 
These findings support research claiming that trade in services is not as reliant on 
distance as trade in goods. While the services trade necessitates cooperation and active 
involvement of importer and exporter (Hill, 1999), distance is not a significant issue as physical 
as may be seen. Physical distance in service trade can be alternated by an increased inclination 
to use technology that defines the modern era. 
Regarding dummy variables, such as landlocked, PPML estimation gave us a 
significant result (p<0.05): trade between landlocked countries decreases more than 40% in 
both services and reasonable compared to the rest, as expected. In contrast, the estimation result 
with OLS fixed effect is statistically insignificant for both service and goods trade. 
Countries sharing the borders are likely to have 73% more services traded compared to 
the other trade pairs, while this value is 17% for goods, according to OLS FE in Table 3. If we 
look at the PPML estimation, a rise could be observed in both service and goods trade, 
accounted for 94% and 40%, respectively. As the common border is correlated with 
communication costs and cultural differences, having a larger effect on service trade can be 
explained. These findings intersect with the prior empirical studies that contiguity is significant 
with 70% (Head & Mayer, 2014). However, the studies by Álvarez et al. (2018) values are vice 
versa, which is depicted 20% and 70% effect on service and goods trade, respectively. The 
colony coefficient is 1% statistically relevant and has a positive symbol. According to OLS 
estimation, the positive coefficient means that the colonial link between two countries greatly 
supports the trade between the home country and its partner country. In the case of importers 
for both service and good trades, having more population leads to more imports which is 
understandable; however, it is statistically insignificant. When it comes to exporting country, 
we can observe that a 1% increase in population leads to 40% decrease in the country's volume 
of exporting services, although the score for exporter good trade is not statistically significant. 
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To summarize these estimations, we can state that TLA plays a more significant role in 
good trade than service trades, according to the OLS and PPML pair-fixed effect models. When 
it comes to other control variables, all of them are statistically significant as expected.  
Evidence from earlier papers supports these results as well.  
4.2 The effect of the selected governance indicators on service and good trade. 
In the first subsection, we have studied the effect of TLA on the trade of goods and 
services. While trade agreements themselves can have different effects due to the heterogeneity 
and one aspect of heterogeneity is the institutional efficiency indicators. In this part, we will 
extend the analysis and focus on how trade agreements between countries affect the bilateral 
trade flow considering the role of institutional quality, specifically on service and good trade. 
Improved institutional framework consistency eliminates confusion about contract compliance 
and general economic governance. This decreases transaction costs directly by improving 
property protection and indirectly contributing to raising the trust in the economic transaction 
processes (Álvarez et al., 2018). Since traders in both countries have similar levels of 
institutional effectiveness, they would be better able to join the same trade agreements. The 
efficiency in which institutions secure and facilitate private transactions is determined by their 
quality. 
On the other hand, bilateral familiarity with trading partners is also significant. This 
decides how effectively traders can utilize each other's institutional capacity. Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) discuss the roles, which language commonality and contiguity can be 
assumed in this case. They also supported the idea that while comparing traded goods and 
domestic goods, transaction costs are smaller than the traded goods since there are more 
informal procedures available to protect property rights. In most studies, it is depicted that rule 
of law, political stability, and regulatory quality show the most vital connection with bilateral 
trade volumes. 
We have analyzed the institutional quality effect on trade from two points of view: 
 Estimating the effect of TLA on both trade of services and goods based on importer 
levels of governance indicators: the rule of law and political stability. To identify 
impacts for developed and transitional countries separately, we selected the threshold 
level of 0. 
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 Estimating the effect of TLA on both trades of services and goods based on institutional 
distance as the difference between importer and exporter countries governance 
indicators and an interaction term between institutional distance and TLA variable.  
Firstly, for analyzing the effect of TLA based on levels of the rule of law, which can be 
seen in Table 4, threshold level 0 is selected to differentiate better transition, and the developed 
the countries` rule of law level. Less than zero indicates transition countries having a low level 
of the rule of law, and vise versa is applied to developed countries. Results are precise, as seen 
from Table 4. There appears to be a clear distinction between countries with a higher level of 
the rule of law and those with a common rule of law. The TLA effect is driven by developed 
countries with a high level of the rule of law for both service and good trade, which accounted 
for 86% for service and 146% for a good trade.  When we look deeply at Table 4, the contrast 
between the effect of TLA on developed and transitional economies is observed dramatically 
higher for service trade compared to good.  
Table 4 
OLS  estimation: Effect of TLA based on levels of rule of law 
                              Service trade                               Good trade 
                       im_rlw5<0           im_rlw>0             im_rlw<0         im_rlw>0 
TLA                 0.110               0.619***               0.723***         0.898*** 
                        (1.39)              (17.29)                    (8.00)              (20.74)    
Constant          4.121***          4.917***               4.947***        5.451*** 
                        (103.25)           (175.58)                 (108.39)          (160.75)  
Chi^2                           86.74                                               3.25 
P value                        0.0000                                             0.0713 
Fixed effect        No                    No                          No                 No  
N                        4494                17178                      4487              17077    
Notes: 
(i) t statistics in parentheses 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: authors` calculations 
                                                          
 
 
5 Rule of law of importer country 
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To reinforce the results that we have discovered in Table 4, we run a test for examining 
whether a difference of the coefficients of TLA in these two groups is statistically significant 
or not. Suest test is used to compare the regression coefficients across groups.6 According to 
Chi-square and P-value results in Table 4, the difference for service trade is statistically 
significant, while it is insignificant for a good trade. 
We have conducted the same estimations for political stability indicators, which can be 
observed in Table 5. The outcomes are similar to the result of the rule of law: countries with 
higher political stability benefit more from TLA`s in both service and good trade. 
Correspondingly, the gap between the TLA effect on transitional and developed economies for 
a good trade is lower than service. In transitional countries with a low level of political stability, 
TLA shows a noticeably lower effect on service and good trade, respectively 28% and 103%, 
compared to developed nations with high political stability levels having 129% for service and 
188% for a good trade.  
Table 5:  
OLS  estimation: Effect of TLA based on levels of political stability 
                              Service trade                               Good Trade 
                           im_ps7<0          im_ps>0            im_ps<0         im_ps>0    
TLA                    0.280***        0.827***           0.709***        1.063*** 
                            (4.35)             (22.70)              (9.31)              (24.48)    
Constant              4.440***        4.741***          5.255***         5.293*** 
                            (105.86)         (171.77)           (106.05)            (160.72) 
Chi^2                               55.84                                         16.78 
P value                             0.0000                                      0.0000 
Fixed effect            No                    No                     No                 No  
N                           5185                 16487              5170                16394    
Notes: 
(i) t statistics in parentheses 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Source: authors` calculations 
                                                          
 
 
6 https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/code/comparing-regression-coefficients-across-groups-using-suest/  




At the same time, we perform the same tests again to see if the discrepancy in TLA 
coefficients between these two categories is statically significant for political stability measures. 
The Chi-square and p-value from Table 5 show that the regression coefficients of TLA for 
countries with high levels and low levels of political stability do indeed significantly differ as 
a p-value less than 0.05 - we reject the Null hypothesis of being the same. Thus, trade 
liberalization agreements among politically stable countries significantly impact bilateral 
service and good trade. However, trade costs will rise between trade partners in politically 
unstable countries, restricting incentives for establishing and sustaining relations. Therefore, 
even signing Trade Liberalization Agreements will not be effective in this scenario. 
Table 6.  
Effect of Institutional difference on trade (without fixed effect*) 
                                                                             OLS 
 Service trade Good trade 
TLA -0.022        (0.0263)                                 0.275***    (0.0345) 
Difference Rule of Law  
(log) 
-0.198***   (0.0106)                               -0.199***   (0.0170) 
TLA*Difference Rule of  
Law(log) 
0.124***    (0.0133)                               0.161***    (0.0200) 
 
Difference of Political 
stability(log) 




-0.098***   (0.0139)                             -0.048**    (0.0185) 
Constant -21.04***   (0.166)                               19.93***    (0.238) 
Observation               20495             20388 
adj. R-sq                                      0.803                          0.729                 
Notes: 
(i) Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(iii) All models include time-varying importer and exporter dummy variables. 
(iv) OLS: ordinary least squares.  
(v) The other variables are the same as in Table 2 
Source: authors` calculations 
 
In addition to the importer`s institutional quality level, the influence of institutional 
distance indicators is evaluated. The estimation results focusing on the institutional distance 
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between importer and exporter are presented in Table 6. Both distance governance indicators 
are statistically significant and negative, except for the difference in political stability for 
service trade. The negative sign of the coefficient of the rule of law implies that differences in 
the institutional quality suppress the trade in both service and good trade.  
It shows that nations are willing to trade with countries with a more similar quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, and court systems. The interaction term of Trade 
agreements with distance indicator of the rule of law shows a 16% effect on a good trade. 
Generally, compared to the effect of the rule of law distance indicator, the effects political 
stability difference is lower in both service and goods trade. 
Table 7.  
Effect of Institutional difference on trade 





Service Good Service Good 
TLA 0.263***  




(0.0736)           
0.505*** 
(0.0802)                     
0.044 
(0.173)             
0.130** 
(0.0477)    
Difference in Rule Law  
(log) 
-0.163*** 
(0.00952)     
 
-0.188*** 
(0.0144)                    
-0.163*** 
(0.0144)                     
0.096** 
(0.0294)                    
-0.001 
(0.0289)               
-0.010 





(0.0115)          
0.165*** 
(0.0164)                     
0.164*** 
(0.0192)            
0.016 
(0.0303)                          
0.037 
(0.0313)                      
0.012  
(0.0113)      
Difference in Political 
stability(log) 
-0.024* 
(0.0104)             
-0.055*** 
(0.0119)        
0.016 
(0.0131)                       
-0.087*** 
(0.0216)         
0.063 
(0.0323)             
-0.026** 




(0.0123)              
0.023 
(0.0148)                             
0.0078 
(0.0199)                   
-0.029 
(0.0245)               
-0.104** 
(0.0402)                     
0.008 
(0.0096)       
Constant   5.047  
(4.932)                  
-9.053** 
(3.435)                                                                  
    
Observation 20495 20388 20495 20495 21402   21378 
adj. R-sq                       0.869            0.844                 1.0                        1.0                        1.0                        1.0                     
Notes: 
(i) Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
(ii) Statistical significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(iii) All models include time-varying importer and exporter dummy variables. 
(iv) OLS: ordinary least squares. PPML: Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood  
(v) The other variables are the same as in Table 3 




Through Table 7, we are comparing three different estimation methods for the effects 
of institutional difference on trade flow. According to the Fixed Effect (FE) estimation, as 
expected, the more difference in the rule of law level between countries, the less trade flow is 
observed in both service and goods trade, accounting for 16% and 19%, respectively. Again, 
generally, it is depicted that compared to the effect of the rule of law distance indicator, the 
effects of political stability difference are lower both on service and goods trade, which is 
confirmed by OLS FE and PPML estimations, account for around 2% and 6%, respectively. 
The reason arises from the difference between scopes of indicators. For instance, the rule of 
law estimation is addressed to almost the same for all regions of countries. However, it may 
have significant differences among several areas of one country when it comes to political 
stability, in reality. In some countries, most industrial sites are collected in one developed 
region where most trade flow happens. In general, these regions are considerably higher 
political stability and security measures. Therefore, politically unstable transition countries do 
not have a significant role in service and good trade flow, while it influences the country's 
political stability.  
Regarding the sectoral difference between goods and service trade, it can be concluded 
that institutional distance indicators obtain a larger impact on goods trade flow than service, 
which is supported by OLS FE and PPML estimations. Institutional distance in service trade 
can be substituted for using information and telecommunication technology that define the 
modern era. In comparison with good trade, in terms of quality, service trade can be non-
contractible and less visible for courts (Guiso et al., 2009). In addition, goods exported from a 
country with high institutional quality to a country with a low level can object to bribery and 
other illegal costs. This explanation is reinforced by interaction terms of trade agreements with 
distance indicators of the rule of law and political stability. The interaction term of TLA and 
institutional difference in the rule of law which coefficient equal to 16% (Table 7, OLS FE), 
show us that this interaction indeed diminishes the effect of TLA on trade. On the order hand, 
the interaction of TLA with political stability is statistically insignificant almost in all the 
models. In order to see the results clearly, we addressed to plot of the regression results of OLS. 
PPML with fixed effects for TLA, the difference in the rule of law, and their interaction term 
with TLA, which can be seen in Appendix E and F. To get these graphs, firstly, we found out 
minimal and maximal values for a log of differences in the rule of law indicator, which varied 
from -9 to 1, then we calculated the effect of TLA on trade. These figures indeed show that the 
effect of TLA on both trade decrease as the difference in institutional quality increase. 
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Although in Appendix F, compare to service trade, the effect of TLA on good trade displays 
an increase, it is too minor. 
While analyzing with PPML pair fixed effect, most results are statistically insignificant. 




The article examines the effect of Trade Liberalization Agreements, which covers all 
types of free trade agreements, on both the service and good trade, respectively. Furthermore, 
we evaluate the role of institutional governance measures such as the rule of law and political 
stability on service and good trade from two different perspectives: first, how trade agreements 
between countries with varying levels of institutional quality affect bilateral service and good 
trade. Second, consider how institutional distance and the interaction concept between 
institutional distance and the TLA variable influence trade.  
Analysis of bilateral trade flow of 43 countries over 12 years shows us that participating 
in the same trade agreements enables countries to boost their trade in goods more than in service. 
There can be several reasons for this occurrence. Firstly, probably, not all the services are 
included in all kinds of trade liberalization agreements. Therefore, TLAs are still not strongly 
effective in eliminating barriers against service imports. Secondly, compared to a good trade, 
which is subjected to the tariffs on a country-by-country basis, service trade is subject to 
technical barriers such as legislation, visa procedures, or physical barriers that limit the 
provision of telecommunication services that rarely differentiate between countries. Francois 
and Hoekman (2010), who conclude that service trade cannot be quickly and directly targeted 
by tariffs or taxes of governments, support this idea. Both OLS confirms this result without 
fixed, OLS FE, and PPML pair fixed-effects models. According to OLS FE, TLA leads to 
increasing average bilateral good trade by 90%, while this estimation accounted for 30% for 
service. These findings are similar to those from (Álvarez et al., 2018) analysis, in which 23% 
effect is found.  
As a result of analysis regarding the effect of TLAs with different institutional quality 
levels, TLA plays a significant role in both service and good trade in the countries having a 
high level of the rule of law and political stability. The contrast between the effect of TLA on 
developed countries with a high level of institutional quality and transitional economies with a 
39 
 
low level is observed dramatically higher for service trade compared to good. These results 
were supported by the comparison of TLA regression coefficients across country groups that 
were statistically significant.  
We concluded that as the institutional distance-the difference in the rule of law and 
political stability increase in counties, the trade volume decrease in both service and sound. In 
contrast, institutional distance indicators obtain a larger impact on goods trade flow than 
service, which OLS FE and PPML analysis supported. The reason for this we assume to be a 
possibility of institutional distance in service trade being substituted using information and 
telecommunication technology that define the modern era. Compared with good trade, in terms 
of quality, service trade can be non-contractible and less visible for courts (Guiso et al., 2009). 
In the study, the interaction term of TLA and institutional distance also is analyzed, and it is 
found that due to interaction terms, differences in institutional quality of countries reduced the 
effect of TLA on trade in service and reasonable.  
When it comes to other control variables such as landlocked, contiguity, everyday 
language, they are statistically significant as expected. In our study, geographical distance is 
consistently more critical for good trade than for service trade. As the distance between 
countries increases, it leads to lower goods trade volume by 67% and services trade by 55 %, 
which this value is similar to Álvarez et al. (2018) and Head and Mayer (2014).  
The topics related to trade and heterogeneity effects are broad, resulting in not every 
aspect analyzed in detail by literature. Some topics related to analyzing the role of the specific 
FTA's on integration processes and the role of trade agreements on improving the institutional 
quality of countries were not profoundly studied in recent literature. Combined effects of 
institutions on trade or how joining FTA's effect the quality of institutions in transitional 
economies could also be interesting for further analysis.  
The results, particularly from this paper, would advise the countries, especially 
developed ones, to enter trade agreements as much as possible since it would increase their 
trade volume in terms of both service and good trades. Another suggestion for policy would be 
improving and conducting new reforms in the legal system as it will also have a significant 
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Vabakaubanduslepete mõjud teenuste ja kaupade rahvusvahelisele 
vahetusele: kuidas antud seos sõltub riikide institutsionaalsetest erinevustest 
Kokkuvõte 
Käesolev magistritöö uurib riikidevaheliste vabakaubanduslepete mõju teenuste ja toodete 
rahvusvahelisele kaubandusele. Analüüsitakse riikide institutsioonide kvaliteedi alaste 
näitajate ja nende näitajate riikidevaheliste erinevuste rolli antud seoses: sh õigusriigi 
põhimõtete/seaduste järgimise (i.k. rule of law) ja poliitilise stabiilsuse rolli 
vabakaubanduslepete seoses kaubandusega. Empiirilises analüüsis hinnatakse kõigepealt 
gravitatsioonimudelid vähimruutude meetodil ilma fikseeritud efektideta, seejärel koos 
importija-perioodi ja eksportija-perioodi fikseeritud efektidega ning viimaks ka kaasajal 
gravitatsioonimudeli hindamisel tavapärase PPML (i.k. Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood) 
meetodiga, arvestamaks heteroskedastiivsusega andmetes ja riikide ja riigipaaride oluliste 
erinevustega (nn multilateral resistance terms).  
Empiiriline gravitatsioonimudeli analüüs  43 riigi andmete põhjal, sh OECD riigid ja ka valim 
siirderiikidest, näitab, et vabakaubanduslepetes osalemine võimaldab riikidel tõsta rohkem just 
toodete kaubandust võrreldes teenuste kaubandusega. Kaubanduse liberaliseerimise panus 
toodete ja teenuste kaubanduse kasvu ilmneb käesolevas töös eelkõige arenenud riikide puhul, 
millel on tugev institutsionaalse arengu tase üldise õigusriigi põhimõtete/seaduste järgimise 
näitaja osas. Gravitatsioonimudeli hindamise tulemused näitavad, et  õigusriigi 
põhimõtete/seaduste järgimine on uuritud valimis oluliselt tähtsam rahvusvahelise kaubanduse 
jaoks võrreldes näiteks poliitilise stabiilsuse indikaatoriga. Bilateraalse kaubanduse mudelitest, 
mis sisaldavad korraga kaubanduse liberaliseerimise näitaja ja riikide institutsionaalse 
erinevuse indikaatoreid järeldub, et erinevused kauplevate riikide institutsionaalse kvaliteedi 
tasemes piiravad väliskaubanduse liberaliseerimise positiivseid mõjusid. 
Võtmesõnad: Väliskaubandus, gravitatsioonimudel, vabakaubanduslepped, kaupade ja 










The list of countries 
Australia Hungary Slovakia 
Austria Ireland Slovenia 
Belgium Iceland Sweden 
Canada Israel Turkey 
Chile Italy United State 
Czech Republic Japan Georgia 
China Korea Belarus 
Germany Luxemburg Kazakhstan 
Denmark Latvia Moldova 
Spain Mexico Russian Federation 
Estonia Netherland Ukraine 
Finland Norway Serbia 
France New Zealand  
United Kingdom Poland  
Greece Portugal  














 Relationship between importer rule of law and trade
 

















Relationship between importer political stability and trade 
           





















Description of Variables 
 Description Coverage Source 
                                                         Dependent Variables 
Service IM (log) Total service trade of importer(home) 
country 
2004-2015 OECD 
Good IM (log) Total good trade of importer(home) country 2004-2015 OECD 
Independent Variables 
GDP IM (log) Gross Domestic Product of importer (home) 
country 
2004-2015 CEPII 
GDP EX (log) Gross Domestic Product of exporter 
(partner) country 
2004-2015 CEPII 
POP IM (log) Population of importer (home) country 2004-2015 CEPII 
POP EX (log) Population of exporter (partner) country 2004-2015 CEPII 
Distance (log) Dummy variable equal to distance between 
importer and exporter country (km) 
2004-2015 CEPII 
Language Dummy variable set equal to 1 if partner 
countries  share the same language 
2004-2015 CEPII 
Colony Dummy variable set equal to 1 if partners 
countries have historical colonial tie 
2004-2015 CEPII 
Contiguity Dummy variable set equal to 1 if a trade flow 






TLA  Dummy variable represents all trade 
liberalization agreements and set equal to 1 
if the partner countries are the part of the 






Database CU  Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the partner 
countries are the part of the same Custom 
Unions 
2004-2015 
EIA Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the partner 
countries are the part of the same Economic 
integrated agreements. 
2004-2015 
Landlocked dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 for landlocked 
countries 
2004-2015 CEPII 
                                               Institutional indicators  
Im_rlw Importer country rule of law level 2004-2015  
 
    World 
Bank 
Im_ps Importer country political stability level 2004-2015 
Lndiff.rlw Difference between the rule of law level of 
importer and exporter countries(log) 
2004-2015 
Lndiff.ps Difference between political stability level 




Interaction term between TLA difference in 




Interaction term between TLA and 






Change of TLA-trade relationship per log difference in rule of law (OLS) 
                 
                
                 



































































Change of TLA-trade relationship per log difference in rule of law (PPML) 
           
 
          































































Trade Liberalization Agreements signed by countries in dataset for the period 
Trade Liberalization 
Agreement Name 
Coverage Type Signatories 
Brazil - Mexico Goods PSA Brazil, Mexico 
Canada - Israel Goods FTA Canada, Israel 
EFTA - Canada Goods FTA Canada; Iceland; Norway; Switzerland 
EFTA - Serbia Goods FTA Serbia; Iceland; Norway; Switzerland 
EFTA - Turkey Goods FTA Turkey; Iceland; Norway; Switzerland 
EU - Iceland Goods FTA 
Iceland; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece;  Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Israel Goods FTA 
Israel; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Turkey Goods CU 
Turkey; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
Georgia-Kazakhstan Goods FTA Georgia; Kazakhstan 
Georgia - Russian 
Federation Goods FTA Georgia; Russian Federation 
Georgia - Ukraine Goods FTA Georgia; Ukraine 
Israel - Mexico Goods FTA Israel; Mexico 
Korea, Republic of - 
Turkey Goods FTA Korea, Republic of; Turkey 
Russian Federation - 
Serbia Goods FTA Russian Federation; Serbia 
Turkey - Chile Goods FTA Chile; Turkey 
Turkey - Georgia Goods FTA Georgia; Turkey 
Turkey - Israel Goods FTA Israel; Turkey 
Turkey - Serbia Goods FTA Turkey; Serbia 
Ukraine - Belarus Goods FTA Belarus; Ukraine 
Ukraine-Kazakhstan Goods FTA Kazakhstan; Ukraine 
Ukraine - Moldova Goods FTA Moldova, Republic of; Ukraine 
United States - Israel Goods FTA Israel; United States of America 
Australia - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA Australia; Chile 
Canada - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA Canada; Chile 
Canada - Korea, 
Republic of Goods & Services FTA & EIA Canada; Korea, Republic of 
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Chile - China Goods & Services FTA & EIA Chile; China 
Chile - Japan Goods & Services FTA & EIA Chile; Japan 
Chile - Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA Chile; Mexico 
China - Korea, 
Republic of Goods & Services FTA & EIA China; Korea, Republic of 
China - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA China; New Zealand 
EFTA - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Chile; Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; 
Switzerland 
EFTA - Korea, 
Republic of Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Korea, Republic of; Iceland; Liechtenstein; 
Norway; Switzerland 
EFTA - Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Mexico; Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; 
Switzerland 
EFTA - Ukraine Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Ukraine; Iceland; Liechtenstein; Norway; 
Switzerland 
EU - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Chile; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Georgia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Georgia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Korea, Republic 
of 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Korea, Republic of; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; 
Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; 
Portugal; Romania; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; 
Spain; Sweden 
EU - Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Mexico; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; 
Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; 
Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovak 
Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Moldova, 
Republic of 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Moldova, Republic of; Austria; Belgium; 
Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; 
Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; 
Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovak Republic; 
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
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EU - Serbia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Serbia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
EU - Ukraine Goods & Services FTA & EIA 
Ukraine; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; 
Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; 
Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden 
Iceland - China Goods & Services FTA & EIA China; Iceland 
Japan - Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA Australia; Japan 
Japan - Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA Japan; Mexico 
Japan - Switzerland Goods & Services FTA & EIA Japan; Switzerland 
Korea, Republic of - 
Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA Australia; Korea, Republic of 
Korea, Republic of - 
Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA Chile; Korea, Republic of 
Korea, Republic of - 
New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA Korea, Republic of; New Zealand 
Korea, Republic of - 
United States 
Goods & Services FTA & EIA Korea, Republic of; United States of America 
Switzerland - China Goods & Services FTA & EIA China; Switzerland 
United States - 
Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA Australia; United States of America 
United States - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA Chile; United States of America 
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